We consider the problem of private computation of approximate Heavy Hitters. Alice and Bob each hold a vector and, in the vector sum, they want to find the B largest values along with their indices. While the exact problem requires linear communication, protocols in the literature solve this problem approximately using polynomial computation time, polylogarithmic communication, and constantly many rounds. We show how to solve the problem privately with comparable cost, in the sense that nothing is learned by Alice and Bob beyond what is implied by their input, the ideal top-B output, and goodness of approximation (equivalently, the Euclidean norm of the vector sum). We give lower bounds showing that the Euclidean norm must leak by any efficient algorithm. *
Introduction
Secure and private multiparty computation has been studied for several decades, starting with [20, 5] . Any protocol for computing a function of several inputs can be converted, gate-by-gate, to a private protocol, in which no party learns anything from the protocol messages other than what can be deduced from the function's input/output relation. The computational overhead is at most polynomial in the size of the inputs.
In recent years, however, input sizes in many problems have grown to the point where "polynomial computational overhead" is too coarse a measure; both computation and communication should be minimized. For example, absent privacy concerns, applications may require that a protocol uses at most polylogarithmic communication. General-purpose secure multiparty computation may blow up communication exponentially, so additional techniques are needed. In one theoretical approach, individual protocols are designed for functions of interest such as database lookup (the private information retrieval problem [8, 17, 6] ) and building decision trees [18] . Another approach, the breakthrough [19] , converts any protocol into a private one with little communication blowup, but imposes a computational blowup that may be exponential.
The approach we follow, which was introduced in [10] , is to substitute an approximate function for the desired function. Many functions of interest have good approximations that can be computed efficiently both in terms of computation and communication. A caveat is that the traditional definition of privacy is no longer appropriate. Instead, a protocol π computing an approximation f to a function f is a private approximation protocol [10] for f if
• π is a private protocol for f in the traditional sense that the messages of π leak nothing beyond what is implied by inputs and f , and,
• the output f leaks nothing beyond what is implied by inputs and f .
Several examples were given in [10] . Another important example, crucial to this article and the first non-trivial example to achieve polylogarithmic communication and polynomial computation, was given in [14] . There, Alice and Bob have vectors a and b of length N , taking integer values in the range [−M, M ]. Their goal is to approximate the Euclidean norm of the sum, a + b 2 . The authors show how to compute an estimate a + b ∼ such that, if k is a security parameter,
• The protocol requires poly(k log(M )N/ǫ) local computation, poly(k log(M ) log(N )/ǫ) communication, and O(1) rounds.
• No party learns more from the protocol messages than can be deduced from the approximate output a + b ∼ and the relevant party's input, and no party learns more from the output a + b ∼ than can be deduced from the exact output a + b 2 .
We will make use of this result.
Our Results
Each of two parties has a vector, a and b, and they want a summary for the vector sum c = a + b. First, we consider the Euclidean approximate heavy hitters problem, in which there is a parameter, B, and the players ideally want c opt , the B largest terms in c, i.e., the B biggest values together with the corresponding indices. Unfortunately, finding c opt exactly requires linear communication.
Instead, the players use polylogarithmic communication (and polynomial work and O(1) rounds) to output a vector c with c − c 2 ≤ (1 + ǫ) c opt − c 2 . In our protocol, the players learn nothing more than what can be deduced from c opt and c 2 . (We discuss below the significance of leaking c 2 .) We can immediately use this result as black box for approximate sparse representations over any orthonormal basis such as wavelet or Fourier, with similar costs. We can also use the result as a black box for taxicab approximate heavy hitters, i.e., finding c with c − c 1 ≤ (1 + ǫ) c opt − c 1 , leaking c opt and c 2 .
In the basic result, we give an at-most-B-term representation that is nearly as good (in the Euclidean sense) as the best B-term representation and leaks no more than the best B-term representation and the Euclidean norm. Leaking the Euclidean norm represents a weaker result than not leaking the Euclidean norm, but (i) leaking c 2 is necessary in some circumstances and (ii) computing or approximating c 2 is desirable in some circumstances. First, we give a straightforward lower bound showing that, for some (reasonable) values of parameters M, N, . . ., computing c leaking only c opt requires Ω(N ) communication. In fact, for some (artificial) classes of inputs, Ω(N ) communication is needed unless c 2 itself is not only potentially leaked, but actually computed exactly. On the other hand, one can regard the Euclidean norm as semantically interesting, so that we can regard the top B terms together with the Euclidean norm as a compound, extended summary. In particular, since c is computed, leaking c 2 is equivalent to leaking c , i.e., the error in our representation, which is a useful and common thing to want to compute. Our protocol indeed can be modified to output an approximation c − c ∼ with c − c 2 ≤ c − c ∼ ≤ (1 + ǫ) c − c 2 , so we can regard the protocol as solving two cascaded approximation problems: find a near-best representation c, then find an approximation c − c ∼ to c − c 2 . It is natural to expect a protocol for c to leak c opt and a protocol for c − c ∼ to leak c − c 2 ; while lower bounds prevent that, we can compute c and c − c ∼ simultaneously and guarantee that, overall, we leak only c opt and c − c 2 . We give a result for taxicab heavy hitters that produces an at-most-B term representation that is nearly as good (in the taxicab sense) as the the best B-term representation and leaks no more than the best B-term representation and the Euclidean norm. Thus we have shown that the private Euclidean norm approximation can be used for non-Euclidean problems. Finally, we also give a result for other orthonormal bases that involves little additional algorithmic or privacy work, but demonstrates that the basic result can be applied in a variety of interesting applications. It says that we provide an at-most-B term Fourier representation that is almost as good (in the Euclidean sense) as the best B-term Fourier representation and leaks no more than the best B-term representation and the Euclidean norm. The Fourier basis may be substituted by any orthonormal basis, such as Hadamard or Wavelet.
Related Work
Other work in private communication-efficient protocols for specific functions includes the Private Information Retrieval problem [8, 17, 6] , building decision trees [18] , set intersection and matching [11] , and k'th-ranked element [1] .
The breakthrough [19] gives a general technique for converting any protocol into a private protocol with little communication overhead. It is not the end of the story, however, because the computation may increase exponentially.
Work in private approximations include [10] that introduced the notion as a conference paper in 2001 and gave several protocols. Some negative results were given in [13] for approximations to NP-Hard functions; more on NP-hard search problems appears in [4] . Recently, [14] gives a private approximation to the Euclidean norm that is central to our paper. Statistical work such as [7] also addresses approximate summaries over large databases, but differs from our work in many parameters, such as the number of players and the allowable communication.
There are many papers that address the Heavy Hitters problem and sketching in general, in a variety of contexts. Many of the needed ideas can be seen in [15] and other important papers include [3, 2, 12, 9 ].
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give preliminaries. In Section 3, we present our main result. In Section 4, we present lower bounds.
Preliminaries

Parameters and Notation
Fix parameters N, M, B, k, ǫ. We will consider two players, Alice and Bob, who will have inputs, a and b respectively, that are vectors of length N taking integer values in the range −M to +M . Throughout, we will be interested in summaries of size B for the vector c = a + b. For example, in the main result, we are interested ideally in the largest B terms of c. A vector c is written c = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N −1 ) = c j δ j , where j is an index, c j is a value, δ j is the vector that is 1 at index j and 0 elsewhere, and c j δ j , which can be implemented compactly and equivalently written as the pair (j, c j ), is a term, in which c j is the coefficient.
We compare terms by the magnitudes of their coefficients, braking ties by the indices. That is, we will say that (j, c j ) < (k, c k ) if |c j | < |c k | or both |c j | = |c k | and j < k. Thus all terms are strictly comparable. A heavy hitter summary is an expression of the form i∈Λ η i δ i . If |Λ| must be at most B, then the best heavy hitter summary c opt for a vector c occurs where {(i, η i ) : i ∈ Λ} consists of the B largest terms.
The Euclidean norm of a is a 2 = i a 2 i and the taxicab norm is a 1 = i |a i |. The support supp(a) of a vector a is the set of indices where a is non-zero, {i : a i = 0}.
The parameter ǫ is a distortion parameter. We will guarantee summaries whose error is at most the factor (1 + ǫ) times the error of the best possible summary.
The parameter k is a security and failure probability parameter. Algorithms will be expected to succeed except with probability 2 −k and 2 −k will serve as an upper bound for the allowable statistical distance between indistinguishable distributions.
We will be interested in protocols that use communication poly(B, log(N ), k, log(M ), 1/ǫ), local computation poly(B, N, k, log(M ), 1/ǫ), and number of rounds that is constant.
Approximate Data Summaries
In the heavy hitters problem, we are given parameters B and N and the goal is to find the B largest terms in a vector c of length N . We will be interested in two approximate versions, parametrized also by ǫ. In the approximate heavy hitters problem, we want a summary c = i∈Λ η i δ i such that c − c ≤ (1 + ǫ) c opt − c , where the norms are, respectively, 2-norms (in the Euclidean approximate heavy hitters problem) and 1-norms (in the taxicab approximate heavy hitters problem).
In order to describe previous algorithms that are relevant to us, we first need some definitions. Fix a vector c = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N −1 ) = 0≤i<N c i δ i , whose terms are t 0 = (0, c 0 ),
That is, an index is signficant if the corresponding value is large compared with all the values. In some of the algorithms below, we will find the largest term (if it is sufficiently large), subtract it off, then recurse on the residual signal. This motivates the following definitions. 
That is, in a significant index set for c, the largest term has a significant index; after removing the largest term, the new largest term has a significant index, etc. Note that there can be more than one θ-significant index set for a given vector.
Definition 2.3 (Qualified index set.) Fix parameters ℓ and θ. The set
Q = {i ′ 0 , i ′ 1 , . . . , i ′ m−1 } is a (ℓ, θ
)-qualified index set for c if and only if
• m ≤ ℓ,
} is a θ-significant index set, and
That is, a qualified index set consists of the largest possible length m for a prefix of
such that, for each j < m, we have c 2
. In particular, if the terms happen to be in decreasing order to begin with, i.e., if |c 0 | > |c 1 | > · · ·, then a qualified index set is {0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 1} for the largest m such that, for each j < m, we have
. Note that for each ℓ, θ, and vector c, there is only one (ℓ, θ)-qualified index set for c. We use Q c,ℓ,θ to denote it. We sometimes write Q ℓ,θ when c is understood.
The following are straightforward. 
The result follows.
The algorithms below will work from a linear sketch of a vector.
Definition 2.6 (Sketch of a vector.) Given a vector c, a linear sketch of c is
Rc, where R is a random matrix generated from a prescribed distribution, called the measurement matrix.
In our case, as is typical, the matrix R will be a pseudorandom matrix, that can be generated from a short pseudorandom seed. We will use sketching for the norm estimation protocol, in which the generator needs to be secure against small space, and a different measurement matrix in the the non-private Euclidean Heavy Hitters protocol, where, e.g., pairwise independence suffices for the pseudorandom number generator.
An algorithm in connection with the Euclidean approximate heavy hitter problem satisfying the following is known:
There is a distribution on sketch matrices R and a corresponding algorithm that, from R and sketch Rc of a vector c, outputs a superset of Q c,B,θ , in time poly(log(N ), log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ).
In particular, the number or rows in R and the size of the output is bounded by the expression poly(log(N ), log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ) in accordance with the time bound on the algorithm.
Note that the algorithm returns a superset of Q c,B,θ but that even Q c,B,θ itself suffices for a good approximation.
Proof: [sketch] One such algorithm is as follows. As in [12] , one can estimate c i by c i = δ T i R T Rc± (ǫ/B) c 2 except with small probability, where R is a ±1-valued matrix with poly(log(N ), B, 1/ǫ) independent rows, each of which is a pairwise independent family. By repeating O(k) times and taking a median, one can drive down the failure probability to 2 −k . As in [12] , one need not estimate all the terms; rather, in time poly(log(N ), log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ), one can find a set I of indices that includes all terms with magnitude at least θ c 2 (and possibly other terms). By adjusting parameters, one can estimate such c i well enough as c i so that 
Privacy
Secure multiparty computation allows two or more parties to evaluate a specified function of their inputs while hiding their inputs from each other. We work in the semi-honest model, which assumes that the adversary is passive and can't modify the behavior of corrupted parties. In particular, the computation is only concerned with the information learned by the adversary, and not with the effect misbehavior may have on the protocol's correctness. We briefly review private two-player protocols in the semi-honest model. A two-party computation task is specified by a (possibly randomized) mapping g from a pair of inputs (a, b) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * to a pair of outputs (c, d) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * . Let π = (π A , π B ) be a two-party protocol computing g. Consider the probability space induced by the execution of π on input x = (a, b) (induced by the independent choices of random inputs r A , r B ). Let view π A (x) (resp., view π B (x)) denote the entire view of Alice (resp., Bob) in this execution, including her input, random input, and all messages she has received. Let output π A (x) (resp., output π B (x)) denote Alice's (resp., Bob's) output. Note that the above four random variables are defined over the same probability space. 
where (g A (x), g B (x)) is the joint distribution of the outputs of g(x).
Privacy. There exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms S A , S B , called simulators, such that:
There are efficient general techniques: • π is a private protocol for g in the traditional sense.
• (Functional Privacy.) There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that:
In our case, g(a, b) will formally be the pair (c opt , c 2 ) and g(a, b) will be c. We will informally say that we "approximate c opt leaking only c opt and c 2 ," since there is a simulator that takes c opt and c 2 as input and simulates the approximate output c and the protocol messages. Equivalently, one could define g(a, b) to be the pair (c opt , c opt − c ) and define g(a, b) to be the pair ( c, c − c ∼ ), where · ∼ is an approximation to the Euclidean norm (see below).
In our case of a deterministic function to be output to both Alice and Bob, a (weakly) equivalent definition is as follows, known as the "liberal" definition in [10] 
• g is a good approximation to g (in the appropriate sense)
• There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulators S A and S B such that:
Roughly speaking, the equivalence is as follows. Suppose there are simulators in the standard definition. Then, putting g = g, a simulator for the liberal defintion can be constructed by simulating g(a, b) = g(a, b) from g(a, b) using the hypothesized simulator for functional privacy, then simulating Alice's view from g(a, b) and a using the hypothesized simulator traditional simulator for the protocol that computes g. In the other direction, suppose there is a simulator in the liberal definition. Let τ be a transcript of Alice's view except for input a. (As it turns out, it is not necessary to include a in τ . If a is much longer than τ -as in our situation-we want to avoid including a in τ in order to keep τ short.) Define g = g.τ to be g with τ encoded into its low-order bits. We assume that this kind of encoding into approximations can be accomplished without significantly affecting the goodness of approximation; in fact, we will assume that the value represented does not change at all, even if the "approximate" value is zero-that is, τ is auxiliary data rather than an actual part of the value of g. Note that a protocol for g also serves as a protocol for g. It is trivial to simulate the messages of the protocol given a and g. Use the hypothesized simulator in the liberal definition to show functional privacy.
We will use the technique of encoding into the low-order bits in our main result, which, formally, will be proven in the standard definition. We remark that the norm estimation protocol from [14] is presented in the liberal definition.
We will need the following standard definition.
Definition 2.12 (Additive Secret Sharing) An intermediate value x of a joint computation is said to be secret shared between Alice and Bob if Alice holds r and Bob holds x − r, modulo some large prime, where r is a random number independent of all inputs and outputs.
The Private Sample Sum problem is as follows.
Definition 2.13 (Private Sample Sum) At the start, Alice holds a vector a of length N and Bob holds a vector b. Alice and Bob also hold a secret sharing of an index i. At the end, Alice and Bob hold a secret sharing of
That is, neither the index i nor the value a i + b i becomes known to the parties. Efficient protocols for this can be found (or can be constructed immediately from related results) in [19, 10] , under various assumptions about the existence of Private Information Retrieval, such as in [6] .
Proposition 2.14 There is a protocol private-sample-sum for the Private Sample Sum problem that requires poly(N, k) computation, poly(log(N ), k) communication, and O(1) rounds.
Our results also rely on the following protocol from [14] , that privately approximates the Euclidean norm of the vector sum. 
• The protocol is a private approximation protocol for c in the sense of Definition 2.11.
Furthermore, the protocol's only access to a and b is through the matrix-vector products Ra and Rb,
where R is a pseudorandom matrix known to both players.
Private Euclidean Heavy Hitters
We consider the setting in which Alice has signal a of dimension N , and Bob has signal b of the same dimension. Let c = a + b. Both parties want to learn a representation c = t∈Tout t such that c − c 
Analysis
First, to gain intuition, we consider some easy special cases of the protocol's operation. For our analysis, assume that the terms in c are already positive and in decreasing order, c 0 > c 1 > · · · > c N −1 > 0. We will be able to find the coefficient value of any desired term, so we focus on the set of indices. Let I opt = {0, 1, 2, . . . , B − 1} denote the set of indices for the optimal B terms. Thus The ideal output is I opt , though any superset of Q c,B,θ suffices to get an approximation with error at most (1 + ǫ) times optimal. This includes the set I ⊇ Q c,B,θ which the algorithm has recovered. The set I B of the largest B terms indexed by I contains Q c,B,θ , so I B is a set of at most • Output: With probability at least 1 − 2 −k , a set T out of at most B terms, such that c − t∈Tout t ) is used for B independent repetitions of norm estimation. Bob similarly constructs R 1 b and R 2 b.
Using general-purpose SMC, do
• Use an existing (non-private) Euclidean Heavy Hitters protocol to get, from R 1 a and R 1 b, a secret-sharing of a superset I of Q c,B, 
Using SMC, do
• for j = 0 to B − 1 ⊆ I opt , which is correct, but not quite private. Given |I out |, the contents of I out ⊆ I opt are indeed private, but the size of I out is, generally, non-private. Fortunately, if we use a private protocol for norm estimation, |I out | remains private. We now proceed to a formal analysis. Proof: By existing work, all costs of Steps 1 to 3 are as claimed. Now consider Step 4. Observe that the function being computed in Step 4 has inputs and outputs of size bounded by poly(log(N ), log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ) and takes time polynomial in the size of its inputs. In particular, the instances of norm estimation do not start from scratch with a reference to a or b; rather, they pick up from the precomputed short sketches R 2 a and R 2 b. It follows that this function can be wrapped with SMC, preserving the computation and communication up to polynomial blowup in the size of the input and keeping the round complexity to O(1).
We now turn to correctness and privacy. Let I out denote the set of indices corresponding to the set T out of output terms.
Theorem 3.2 Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters is correct.
Proof: The correctness of Steps 2 and 3 follows from previous work. In Step 4 , we first show that Q B,
We assume that 
, then iteration j outputs t i j and the previous iterations output exactly the set of the j larger terms in I.
By Proposition 2.5, since I out is a superset of Q B,
Before giving the complete privacy argument, we give a lemma, similar to the above. Suppose a set P of indices is a subset of another set Q of indices. We will say that P is a prefix of Q if i ∈ P, t j > t i , and j ∈ Q imply j ∈ P . is a prefix of the universe, so Q B,
is a prefix of I. The set I out is also a prefix of I. It follows that, of the sets I out and Q B,
one is a prefix of the other (or they are equal).
So suppose, toward a contradiction, that Q B,
, so q is the least number such that i q is not in Q B,
. If the protocol halts before considering q, then I out ⊆ Q B,
, a contradiction. So, in particular, we may assume that q < B (so the for-loop doesn't terminate). Then, by definition of Q B,
, we have
Thus the protocol halts without outputting t q , after outputting exactly the elements in Q B,
Finally, we turn to privacy. Proof: With the random inputs R 1 and R 2 encoded into the output, it is straightforward to show that Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters is a private protocol in the traditional sense that the protocol messages leak no more than the inputs and outputs. This is done by composing simulators for private-sample-sum and SMC. It remains only to show only that we can simulate the joint distribution on ( c, R 1 , R 2 ) given as simulator-input c opt and c . We will show that R 1 is indistinguishable from independent of the joint distribution of ( c, R 2 ), which we will simulate directly.
First, we show that R 1 is independent. Except with probability 2 −Ω(k) , the intermediate set I is a superset of Q B, ǫ B(1+ǫ) 2 and the norm estimation is correct. In that case, the protocol outputs a prefix of Q B,
and we get identical output if I is replaced by Q B,
can be constructed from c opt and c 2 . Since the protocol proceeds without further reference to R 1 , we have shown that the pair ( c, R 2 ) is indistinguishable from being independent of R 1 . It remains only to simulate ( c, R 2 ).
Note that the output c does depend non-negligibly on R 2 . If |c i j | 2 is very close to θ r j 2 2 , then the test |c i j | 2 < θ r j 2 ∼ in the protocol may succeed with probability non-negligibly far from 0 and from 1, depending on R 2 , since the distortion guarantee on r j 2 ∼ is only the factor (1 ± ǫ). The simulator is as follows. Assume that the terms in c opt are t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t B−1 with decreasing order,
2 and then run the norm estimation simulator on input E j and ǫ to get a sample from the joint distribution ( E j , R 2 ), where E j is a good estimate to E j . Our simulator then outputs t i j if |c i j | 2 ≥ ǫ B(1+ǫ) E j , and halts, otherwise, following the final for-loop of the protocol. Call the output of the simulator s = j t i j δ i j .
Again using the fact that a prefix of Q B,
, then i j = j; i.e., the j'th largest output term is the j'th largest overall, so that, if j is output, we have E j = r j 
• The algorithm uses poly(N, log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ) time, poly(log(N ), log(M ), B, k, 1/ǫ) communication, and O(1) rounds.
• The protocol succeeds with probability 1 − 2 −k and leaks only c opt and c 2 with security parameter k. 
Extension to Taxicab Heavy Hitters
In this section, we show that our result of Euclidean approximation can be extended to approximate taxicab heavy hitters. . From Theorem 3.5 we know 
• The protocol succeeds with probability 1 − 2 −k and leaks only c opt and c 2 with security parameter k.
Extension to other Orthonormal Bases
In It also follows that leaking c 2 is equivalent to leaking F c 2 , so the algorithm is private when transformed to the Fourier domain. Alice and Bob require the additional overhead of computing a Fourier transform locally, which fits within the overall budget.
Lower Bounds
In this Section, we show some lower bounds for problems related to our main problem, such as computing an approximation to c opt without leaking c 2 . The results are straightforward, but we include them to motivate the approximation and leakage of the protocols we present. Proof: Consider the set disjointness problem, which requires Ω(N ) communication [16] . Alice and Bob hold {0, 1}-valued vectors a and b of length N such that each of a and b has exactly (N/4) 1's and the supports are either disjoint or intersect in exactly one index. The task is to determine the intersection size. Then, if c = a + b, we have c The above theorem motivates our study of approximate heavy hitters, for which there are protocols with exponentially better communication cost than the exact heavy hitters problem. The next theorem motivates leaking the Euclidean norm, by showing that any efficient protocol for the approximate heavy hitters problem leaks the Euclidean norm on all instances within a class. Fix B = 1 and ǫ ≫ 1/N . A correct protocol finds the top term in case 1. In case 2, it turns out that the correctness requirement is vacuous, but, fortunately, the privacy requirement is useful. A protocol leaking only c opt must behave indistinguishably in cases 1 and 2 since c opt is the same, so a private protocol reliably finds the the top coefficient in case 2. Since a protocol for case 2 can be used to solve the set disjointness problem, such a protocol uses Ω(N ) bits of communication. In particular, any protocol either behaves differently on the two cases-thereby computing c 2 for inputs in the union of the two cases-or uses communication Ω(N ).
Note that the above theorem also shows that it is impossible in some cases to solve the approximate taxicab heavy hitters problem efficiently without leaking the Euclidean norm.
Although the class of inputs above is contrived, the (implied) parameter settings are natural, i.e., log(M ), log(N ), B, k, 1/ǫ can be made to be polynomially related, etc.
